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Abstract 
 
We use high-quality panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant U.S. attorneys 
and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling 
endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those 
who undertake corrupt acts. Consistent with “system capacity” arguments, we find that greater 
prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. We find more 
limited, recent evidence for the deterrent effect of increased prosecutions. We control for and 
confirm in a panel context the effects of many previously identified correlates and causes of 
corruption. By explicitly determining the allocation of prosecutorial resources endogenously 
from past corruption convictions and political considerations, we show that this specification 
leads to larger estimates of the effect of resources on convictions. The results are robust to 
various ways of measuring the number of convictions as well as to various estimators. 
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 Academics and practitioners alike lavish attention on corruption, commonly defined as the 
misuse of public office for private gain. The misuse of political and administrative power at the 
expense of citizens remains a problem in both developing and developed democracies. The abuse 
of office takes many forms, from receiving direct payments for political favors to election 
tampering to enacting legislation or otherwise channeling public money for private benefit to 
groups of friends, clients, supporters, or voters. Quintessentially, corruption is about taking 
payment for an illegal act, or somehow inappropriately enriching oneself from the public purse. 
Many studies investigate corruption’s political, cultural, historical, and economic determinants. 
There is less empirical research on what actually to do to combat it.1 In this paper, we investigate 
the effects of increasing enforcement effort, specifically by increasing prosecutorial resources, 
on corruption. 
On the one hand, deterrence theory, originating in economics with Becker (1968) and in 
the context of corruption Becker and Stigler (1974), predicts that more prosecutorial resources, 
by increasing the risk of successful prosecution, should deter public officials and employees 
from engaging in corrupt activities. Following Becker and Stigler (1974), Besley and McLaren 
(1993), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), and Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2009) among others 
model publicly employed agents’ decision to take money from corrupt as opposed to legal 
activities, at the margin comparing the consequences of honest behavior with the size of the rents 
from illegal activities, allowing for the probability of being investigated, detected, charged, 
convicted, jailed and expelled from public service. These models of “economic” factors suggest 
that more enforcement can produce fewer corruption convictions, as long as a higher probability 
of enforcement discourages enough public officials from choosing corrupt activities.  
                                                 
1 Authors from Klitgaard (1988) through Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 52-3) to Lambsdorff (2007, Ch. 2) remark on the 
lack of empirical research on enforcement. van Aaken et al. (2010) consider the effect of prosecutorial independence, 
but not their resources. 
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On the other hand, theories of “system capacity” or “system overload” originating largely 
in criminology (e.g. Pontell et al. 1994) argue that white-collar crimes, including corruption, are 
insufficiently prosecuted. Some overload followed the expansion of the legal basis for federal 
prosecution of state and local corruption in the period after Watergate (Archambeault and 
Elmore 1983; Maass 1987).2 While this part of system strain reflects a lack of funds allocated to 
enforcement, it also can result from incentives facing prosecutors. For example, Rasmusen et al. 
(2009) show that in a rewards system focused on conviction rates, prosecutors can find it optimal 
to forego prosecutions of complex cases with more uncertain outcomes and instead prosecute 
only cases that can with reasonable certainty result in a prosecutorial victory. Thus, according to 
system capacity theory, increasing prosecutorial capacity and resources can increase the number 
of prosecutions and convictions. In the context of corruption cases, Meier and Holbrook (1992) 
write that if  “convictions were simply the result of slack prosecution resources … we would 
expect that convictions would be positively related to the number of federal prosecutors….” 
Whitford (2002) makes the same argument about prosecutorial staff. 
 These models provide core intuitions underlying our empirical analysis. Since both 
effects can be present at the same time, the net result of more resources, that is, which effect 
dominates in practice, can go either way, depending on factors we discuss below. As an 
empirical matter in the United States, though the literature is not long, Whitford (2002) finds 
evidence for a positive relationship between prosecutor resources and convictions while Meier 
and Holbrook (1992) finds no such association. Levitt (1997, 2002) finds evidence that more 
police resources result in less crime. The latter, though not specifically about corruption, makes 
                                                 
2 Legal scholars argue that corruption became a federal priority in the mid-1970s. See also Baxter (1982, p. 322) and 
Ogren (1973), who complains about a lack of resources.  
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clear how important it is to take account in estimation of the clearly endogenous decision about 
how many resources to allocate to combating public corruption.  
However, political corruption cases are not only about corruption, but there can also be 
“partisan influences on prosecutorial discretion” (Beale 2009). The decision to prosecute 
ultimately rests with the US attorneys, who are appointed by the President with the advice and 
support of home-state co-partisans. Not only do partisan factors affect appointment decisions, but 
as shown by Gordon (2009) there is a clear and systematic partisan effect on US attorneys’ 
priorities regarding public corruption cases. In our empirical approach, we put this political bias 
to use as an instrument to correct for the endogenous choice of enforcement resources. 
We use panel data on corruption convictions in U.S. states from 1977-2003 to examine 
how public resources available for the investigation and prosecution of offenders affect the 
calculus of corruption.3 For explanatory variables, instruments, and robustness considerations we 
create two new state-by-state panels: the number of general attorneys in EOUSA offices 
(prosecutorial resources) and relative wages for public employees (a deterrence consideration). 
In selecting control variables, we build on many findings of cross-national research on corruption 
that have already been incorporated in research on American state governments (Adserà et al. 
2003; Alt and Lassen 2003, 2008; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Maxwell and Winters 2005).4  By 
cross-national standards US states are a sample with relatively high incomes and established 
democracy and rule of law. Three important advantages of studying them are: we have a reliable 
                                                 
3 Recent comparative (Treisman 2007) and American (Glaeser and Saks 2006) studies find that corruption has no 
effect on economic growth, despite a large earlier literature to the contrary. While in the states corruption may affect 
borrowing costs (Depken and LaFountain 2006), we leave the consequences of corruption for another paper. 
4 Cross-national empirical research examines how not only income and other social factors but also political factors 
like judicial independence, federal regimes, or electoral institutions (district magnitude, ballot structure, open list 
voting) shape the incentives for politicians to engage in illegal rent-seeking and corrupt activities. See Ades and di 
Tella 1999; Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Seldadyo and de Haan 2005; Treisman 2000, 2007; Uslaner 2008 and 
more specifically on institutions La Porta et al. 2004; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; and Brown et al. 2006. 
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panel of corruption data covering over a quarter of a century which does not rely on surveys or 
expert opinions; we have better data for relative public sector salaries than do the cross-country 
studies; and, perhaps most of all, we have a panel measuring enforcement resources across units, 
important once capacity, detection, and prosecution are considered.  
We find that greater prosecutor resources do indeed result in more convictions for 
corruption overall, other things equal, consistent with “system capacity” arguments. However, 
we also show that the strain on an overburdened system has diminished in more recent years, in 
ways consistent with an emerging deterrence effect. The analysis also takes into account, and 
confirms in a panel context, a number of previously identified correlates and causes of corruption. 
Moreover, we explicitly allow for the allocation of prosecutorial resources to be determined 
endogenously, by past corruption convictions and political considerations, and show that this 
specification leads to larger estimates of the effect of resources on convictions. Overall changes 
in priorities and incentive systems at the federal level are captured by year fixed effects, while 
district, here aggregated to state, fixed effects capture, inter alia, the fact that some judicial 
districts are more attractive for prosecutors building a career. The results are robust to various 
ways of measuring the number of convictions, including moving averages and deflation by both 
population and the number of state and local government employees, as well as to various 
estimators addressing complications arising from the nature of the data. The next section presents 
our theoretical framework and empirical hypotheses. Subsequent sections describe data and 
estimation strategy and present results, considering alternative indicators and specifications.  
I. Enforcement and corruption: a theoretical review 
Public employees and elected officials engaging in corruption run the risk of being caught. In 
some countries and time periods, corruption is and has been socially acceptable and a way of life 
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generally proceeding without interference from the law. However, in most developed countries 
including the US in the period we study, corruption has been recognized as a serious problem 
and has been a subject of police investigations and prosecution. This section does two things. It 
reviews how enforcement resources affect the costs of engaging in corruption, considering both 
deterrence and system strain, with the aim of specifying hypotheses to be evaluated empirically. 
It also examines what determines the allocation of enforcement resources, with the aim of 
correcting for problems of endogeneity in this allocation, which could, if not addressed, lead to 
biased estimates of the effects of enforcement on corruption prosecutions. We also briefly 
discuss two additional hypotheses coming out of our main framework. 
I.1 Economic effects of enforcement resources on corruption behaviour.  
In the economic “efficiency wage” framework of the traditional deterrence literature, the 
expected costs of engaging in corruption rise with the risk of being caught and prosecuted, 
everything else equal. The government employee who maximizes the present discounted value of 
a stream of expected income and contemplates a corrupt act can end up in three situations. First, 
if no corrupt act is committed, the employee simply continues to receive his wage. Second, if he 
engages in corruption but is not detected, he receives both the wage and the “bribe”, the value of 
the corrupt act. Third, if he engages in corruption and is detected and successfully prosecuted he 
receives neither the wage nor the bribe, but incurs a penalty and is fired from public employment. 
In this case, future income is assumed to derive from employment in the private sector. 
Consequently, for a given institutional environment, the corruptible employee’s or official’s 
decision to engage in corruption is affected by (1) wages and expected tenure in the public sector, 
(2) the probability of detection, and (3) the cost of fines and jail terms, and wages in the private 
sector conditional on having been caught for corruption. Holding (1) and (3) constant, an 
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increase in the probability of detection leads to a lower net benefit from corruption. From this 
perspective, we expect the number of corruption prosecutions to decrease as enforcement 
resources increase.  
 In Becker and Stigler (1974), the level of enforcement is the audit probability entering 
the maximization problem of the public employee, but is given from outside the model. 5 
Generally, public enforcement of law (see Polinsky and Shavell 2001, 2007) involves the choice 
of costly enforcement under a budget constraint, so maximal enforcement is typically not 
socially optimal. This creates room to incorporate theories of “system capacity” or “system 
overload” originating in criminology.  
System capacity (e.g. Pontell 1984) refers to the ability of formal agencies to sanction 
crime. According to Pontell, Calavita, and Tillman (1994, p. 393), “exceedingly high workload 
demands in criminal justice agencies [imply that] institutional limits to crime control are present 
for all offences. Yet perhaps they manifest themselves most clearly in the case of white-collar 
and corporate crime” of which corruption is one example. Corruption cases, like other white-
collar crimes, are high effort cases (Richman, 2009), and work on local enforcement of white-
collar crime (e.g. Benson et al. 1990) reports that local prosecutors see the level of resources 
available to them as the primary obstacle for prosecuting white collar crime. Under this view, 
increasing the level of resources, primarily prosecutorial resources, for a given in-flow of 
referrals would tend to increase prosecutions. Over enough time, however, vastly increased 
resources to combat corruption would, we suspect, eventually be internalized by potential 
perpetrators, leading to a lower supply of corruption witnessed by a lower number of referrals 
and ultimately convictions. 
                                                 
5 Experimental results (Ferraz and Finan 2008) show that release of unfavorable audit outcomes does reduce 
incumbents’ subsequent electoral success. 
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Thus, increasing resources spent on enforcement can have countervailing effects. In the 
short run, increasing enforcement resources can increase the number of prosecutions, in 
particular under system strain where prosecution of cases is abstained from for budgetary reasons. 
If the increase in enforcement resources is accompanied by increased relative public wages, there 
could be an offsetting effect. Increased resources can also decrease prosecutions if perpetrator 
adjustment to higher probabilities of enforcement is instantaneous (or such increases were pre-
announced) or if prosecutors have political ambitions (Rasmusen et al. 2009). If deterrence 
effects are present, that is if the supply of corruption is not entirely inelastic with respect to the 
probability of being prosecuted, the longer run effect can be ambiguous, while if there are no 
deterrence effects, long-run effects would continue to be positive.6 
 Returning to the effects of wages and penalties in the deterrence approach, to our 
knowledge, no one has ever systematically investigated the loss of income suffered by those 
convicted of corruption offenses. We cannot do this either. Anecdotal investigation of individual 
cases where information could be obtained from publicly available sources suggests that there is 
usually some loss, frequently severe, consistent with the literature on post-incarceration incomes 
of white-collar criminals (Waldfogel 1994; Western et al. 2001).  Setting a public sector wage 
above the market-clearing wage also decreases the propensity of the public employee to engage 
in corrupt behavior, a now standard efficiency wage result. di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) 
show, in a detailed analysis of corruption at hospitals in Buenos Aires, that higher wages 
decreased corruption, at least conditional on less than maximal monitoring, as suggested by the 
                                                 
6 Moreover, “when the effects of the crime rate on the expected sanction are taken into account, the optimal 
investment in law enforcement … may be greater or smaller than predicted by traditional analysis” (Bar-Gill and 
Harel 2001, p. 499). For example, higher crime rates can change the incentives for citizens to inform police about 
criminal activities; investigations vary in the extent to which information gained in one aids in another.  
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Becker-Stigler model. Goel and Rich (1989) find the same effect in a cross-section of US states. 7 
Using higher government wages as an incentive can thus lower corruption, since the official 
contemplating a corrupt act has more to lose.  
Finally, the shadow of the future is also important within this framework: expected tenure 
in office or government employment affects the expected present value of alternative income 
streams. The Becker-Stigler public official is always corrupt in the final period of employment 
unless the promise of pensions is sufficient to keep him honest. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue 
that in unstable systems the ephemeral nature of public positions makes officials irresponsible 
and grasping: for instance, an elected politician with little or chance of re-election has less 
incentive to do things voters want, like controlling corruption. Again, however, the effect of the 
future is actually ambiguous, as we cannot say in principle whether supply or demand effects 
dominate. Consider a politician with little chance of continuing: while she (or her friends) has 
more incentive to grab what she can while she can, someone who is not going to be in office for 
long is correspondingly less worth “bribing”. 
I.2 The allocation of enforcement resources 
In US states, corruption cases usually begin with criminal investigations, which may or may not 
end in referrals to the U.S. Attorney’s office. For most of the last two decades 80 per cent of such 
referrals came from the FBI.8 Cases are not petty: most frequent lead charges on indictments 
pursued by US Attorneys were based on robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce, theft 
                                                 
7 There is other empirical support: Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find, in a cross-country analysis, that 
countries with higher average government wages relative to average wages in the manufacturing sector have less 
corruption as measured by expert surveys, though Treisman (2000) does not find this. Paldam (2002) notes that 
poorer publicly-employed agents have greater “…temptation to make illicit gains.” Ferraz and Finan (2009) find that 
higher pay improves legislator performance and public-good provision in Brazilian municipalities, though they do 
not investigate corruption directly.  
8 While only one case in three is actually prosecuted, the time from a referral to a decision to decline a prosecution is 
a year and a half, which could itself be a serious sanction. 
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and bribery in entities receiving more than $10,000 in federal funds, the mail fraud statute, 
conspiracies to defraud the federal government, and the RICO statute (Gordon 2009).9 At this 
stage decisions are made about whether to pursue or decline a referred case, which also depend 
on the allocation or resources between corruption cases and other crimes. 
How do enforcement agents, including police and prosecutors, allocate resources between 
different types of crimes? At the level of individual US Attorney offices, research on prosecutors 
argues that they choose which cases to prosecute and which to decline so as to maximize their 
conviction rate (e.g. Rasmusen et al., 2009). For efficiency reasons, we would expect decision-
makers concerned with the number of convictions to allocate scarce prosecutorial resources in a 
way such as to equalize the marginal propensity to convict across judicial districts, and for 
resources within districts to be allocated in the same way. We assume therefore that if enforcers, 
here the EOUSA, want to maximize the number of cases that are successfully prosecuted, they 
“hunt where the ducks are”. More specifically, to maximize successful prosecutions, following 
Knowles, Persico, and Todd’s (2001) analysis of racial profiling in motor vehicle searches, 
enforcers prioritize resources to equalize the probability of detection of corrupt cases across 
districts and subpopulations. They choose “hit rates” in proportion to the expected tendency to 
commit crimes. If hit rates are chosen this way, the distribution of enforcement resources is 
endogenous, with more federal investigative and prosecutorial personnel and resources allocated 
to districts with past patterns of more corruption and other crimes, or perhaps other factors that 
affect, or are correlated with, the likelihood of such crimes. 
 However, U.S. Attorneys are presidential appointees, and so the allocation of resources 
could reflect partisan factors (Schlesinger and Meier 2002; Whitford 2002; Beale 2009; Gordon 
                                                 
9 The source is the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse “TRACFED” at Syracuse University: 
http://tracfed.syr.edu/. Data used under university license. 
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2009; Gordon and Huber 2009). Gordon discusses partisan prosecutions during the Clinton and 
Bush administrations, while Beale describes the US Attorney firings in 2007. Richard Posner 
found partisan bias an obvious possibility, blogging in August 2005:  
Another factor is that most big cities have Democratic mayors …. Republican 
attorneys-general are more likely to investigate and prosecute public corruption in 
Democratic-controlled cities than Democratic attorneys-general are.  
Richman ascribes this to the rise of federal criminal enforcement, which  
as a distinct and valuable component of local ecologies, particularly in urban 
areas, owes a lot to a disjunction between those with national political power and 
those who hold sway locally. The risk that partisan prosecutors with allegiance to 
the president’s party will target local political opponents – either at the behest of 
the White House or on their own – is real. (Richman 2009, p. 2122) 
If the appointment process is politicized in this way, fewer resources would be allocated to 
districts in which co-partisans of the President were in power, in order to skew the distribution of 
prosecutions and convictions away from one’s allies and toward one’s opponents. 
For now, we leave open the motivation of (assistant) US attorneys. We note that models 
of prosecutorial decision-making (e.g. Rasmusen et al. 2009) need not imply that increasing 
resources increases the number of prosecutions. For instance, if attorneys are politically 
motivated, the number of prosecutions can fall when the level of resources increases, if the 
attorney chooses to focus instead on conviction rates.10 In practice, some US Attorney districts 
give greater possibilities for establishing and maintaining a high profile than others. Thus, 
prosecutor motivations and objective functions may differ across districts. As such differences 
                                                 
10  Gordon (2009) argues that prosecutors pursue “high profile” cases. Boylan (2005) argues that “ambitious” 
prosecutors seek longer sentences rather than more convictions. This apparently increases the chance of becoming a 
judge or a partner in a good law firm after leaving office.  
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are (mostly) unobservable, cross-district estimates implicitly assuming similar motivations may 
be biased; in our empirical analysis below, however, the panel structure of the data allows us to 
control for (state) fixed effects, subsuming stable differences in motivations across districts. 
II. Data and Specification  
II.1 Dependent variable:  Corruption convictions 
The cross-national literature on corruption uses surveys of experts and firms to construct 
corruption measures. A number of studies of corruption in the US have used data on corruption 
convictions (“criminal abuses of public trust by government officials”) reported annually by the 
Public Integrity Section of the US Department of Justice (Meier and Holbrook 1992; Glaeser and 
Saks 2006; Maxwell and Winters 2004, 2005) since the 1978 Ethics in Government Act. The 
Section, created in 1976, prosecutes some cases, but most are handled by U.S. Attorneys. While 
the Act spoke of corrupt elected officials, its data clearly includes both elected and appointed 
officials, as well as at least some of those who sought to corrupt them. Early on, local cases were 
the most common but more recently the proportion of federal officials prosecuted has increased. 
The annual data, aggregated to states from U.S. judicial districts, includes some 21,000 cases 
between 1977 and 2003. 
The coverage of these reports far exceeds any available alternative. TRACFED 
Convictions data reported by the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys begins a decade later, in 
1986. When both datasets are available, the positive correlation between them is evident. The 
National Incident-Based Reporting System annual report of white-collar crimes begins a decade 
later still.11 It does not identify crimes involving public officials. Where such identification is 
possible (e.g., bribery) the number of incidents is tiny: Barnett (No date: 3) reports 191 bribery 
                                                 
11 Earlier print editions of Crime in the United States do not contain the state-by-state data. 
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offenses 1997-99, in which years the Public Integrity Section reports 2932 corruption 
convictions. Finally, no repeated survey or expert data is available annually, but note that when 
expert ratings (of corruption and quality of governance) and data on convictions are both 
available, Peters and Welch (1978) and Alt and Lassen (2008) show that convictions and expert 
estimates are positively correlated.12 
There are issues with the data we use, including jurisdictional issues about federal 
prosecution of state and local corruption. Maass (1987) and Gordon (2009) review developments 
and sources. As they make clear, federal prosecutions have more or less eliminated corruption 
prosecutions arising at other levels of government. Data might also be “lumpy” if a large sting or 
investigation results in several convictions in a state in one year followed by a period of apparent 
quiet. We ensure that this does not affect the results we report. Politicized prosecutions are a 
possibility, and we deal with it directly. If corruption in the judicial system manifests itself in 
lower numbers of corruption convictions, convictions data will be ambiguous. We assume this is 
not a widespread problem in the US in the period we study. Overall, we believe these convictions 
data to be of satisfactory quality and comparable across states.  
Following Glaeser and Saks (2006) we normalize convictions by state population. Other 
normalizations are possible13 and we show below that results using different bases do not differ 
qualitatively. The average values by state over all years appear in Figure 1(a), ranging from lows 
in Oregon and Washington to highs in Louisiana and Mississippi. Figure 1(b) first shows (line; 
                                                 
12 Expert data are not without their own problems. Treisman (2007) reports that for “reported experience” of 
corruption nothing else matters once income is controlled, but “reputed” corruption responds inversely to a 
country’s income, a free press, women in the labor force, and the extent of trade. The risk, of course, is that experts 
rating a country are inferring honesty from observables like a lot of trade, while people conducting that trade report 
a different experience. 
13 Maxwell and Winters (who generously made their data available) calculate the number of convictions relative to 
the number of elected officials, as a proxy for the number of all government officials, interpolating and extrapolating 
number of elected officials from a limited number of observations, as do Meier and Holbrook 1992. However, this 
variable has not been updated since 1992 so we eschew that option here.   
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measured on the left-axis) the sum across all states of the number of convictions relative to 
population in each state, year by year. Second (bars; measured on the right-axis), it shows the 
range across states of convictions measured this way. For example, in 1989 the sum across states 
was 198 convictions per million inhabitants (corresponding to 1108 convictions), and the 
convictions rate in 1989 ranges from .4 in Washington state to 9.3 in Mississippi. As the 
distribution is highly skewed, our dependent variable in most subsequent analyses is the 
logarithm of convictions for corruption relative to population measured in millions.14  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Our sample covers the years 1977-2003 for the 48 contiguous states. Details, sources and 
a Table of summary statistics for data appear in the Appendix.   
II.2 Core explanatory variables from the model 
Endogenous enforcement and prosecutor resources  
The quantity of interest is the effect of (endogenous) prosecutor resources on the choice of 
corruption. In the efficiency wage framework this works through its effect on the risk of being 
caught. Since enforcement begins mostly with FBI investigations and case referrals, an ideal 
measure would be the geographical distribution of criminal investigators employed by the FBI. 
However, for (probably obvious) reasons, the FBI apparently does not release that information.15 
An alternative that has considerable variation across time and space arises one step further along 
the investigative process: the staff of the U.S. Attorney’s office, which Whitford (2002) shows to 
                                                 
14 Since we cannot take logs of zero, we add a shift parameter to make sure that state-years with zero convictions are 
not excluded from the analysis. Below, we confirm the robustness of the results using a tobit estimator with the non-
logged number of convictions relative to population.  
15 Other agencies of the Department of Justice (DEA, INS) do release investigator data. However, those agencies are 
not involved much in corruption investigations, nor does the distribution of their staff generate significant empirical 
results for corruption. Other measures, like auditor powers and selection in the states, lack significant time variation 
in our period. See Schelker (2006). Some studies (Cordis 2009; Goel and Nelson 2009) less appropriately employ an 
intermittently-available series for “federal law enforcers”, most of whom have no connection with corruption cases 
or the Department of Justice. 
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be important in the productivity of district offices. Since the dependent variable, convictions, is a 
function of prosecutions, we measure resources as federal full-time-equivalent (FTE) positions in 
the U.S. Attorney’s office for “general attorneys” for each year and judicial district, and then 
aggregate to the state level, again normalizing by state population.16 The data, with ranges across 
states, appears in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Government average and relative wage 
How much, if at all, do we estimate that higher public wages reduce corruption? For every year 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) compiles data on wages and employment across dozens 
of industrial classifications for every state in “Wage and Salary Disbursements by Industry”. For 
state and local government employees, we calculate the average wage and salary disbursements 
by state in current dollars reflecting “Full time and part time wage and salary employment”. In 
the data below we omit part-timers. We use this data to construct three useful variables. First is 
the average wage for state and local government, in current dollars.17 As the measure of the 
current income advantage to being in the public sector, we calculate the ratio of this average state 
and local government wage to the average non-government wage in the state.18 We also calculate 
the average wage for state and local government, in constant dollars, adjusted for the BLS 
regional CPI. Across years, the ratio never exceeds unity on average, though the range for 
individual state-years is from 0.78 to 1.17. 
                                                 
16 Data are available under academic license from tracfed.syr.edu .We measure code 0905, full-time federal general 
attorneys. In years before 1986, the US Attorneys’ offices were combined with Department of Justice “Offices and 
Boards”. Printed reports of the Executive Office of the US Attorney list “Assistant US Attorneys” by district and 
clarify that these data are effectively equivalent to the number of attorneys employed by Offices and Boards. (The 
print data series was discontinued after 1985.) We are confident that the change in description does not introduce 
important errors into the data series.  
17 These are a single code up to 1979 in the BEA data, and two separate codes thereafter. 
18 We calculated the correlations between average legislator compensation and these other relative wage averages. 
They are all positive. Salary data supplied by Thad Kousser.  
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Shadow of the future 
The arguments about considering the agent’s expected tenure or probability of retention at any 
time (which could apply to both elected and appointed officials), suggest a way to estimate the 
effect of the “shadow of the future”. This is to assume that the Governor is responsible for health 
of the state. Higher corruption convictions, a bad outcome, indicate that Governor is, at the 
margin, of lower ability or putting less effort into the job. We are not assuming the Governor is 
convicted nor controlling for Governor’s expected ability.  
We lack systematic data on the probability of re-election of a gubernatorial 
administration at any time. Instead we look at the effect of having a Governor who is a lame 
duck (that is, in the last term of a constitutionally-allowed incumbency) as an indicator of 
officials or an administration with a short horizon. Whether the short tenure induces less 
monitoring effort by the Governor or whether it induces associates of the Governor (some of 
whom may leave public office at the same time) to value corrupt acts more, we expect more 
corruption under term-limited incumbents.19 Moreover, if incumbents subject to a one-term limit 
have worse performance than incumbents under a two-term limit (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and 
Rose 2011) we expect this effect to be larger in the one-term limit case. Further details appear in 
the Appendix. 
II.3 Other social, political, institutional factors 
Our specification also includes as controls variables found to influence corruption in other 
studies of US states for which annual data is available. These include average constant-dollar 
income per capita in the state (Meier and Holbrook 1992; Goel and Nelson 1998; Adserà et al. 
2003; Boylan and Long 2003; Alt and Lassen 2003, 2008; Glaeser and Saks 2006), the 
                                                 
19 Just as ignoring the fact that those who are there longer could also be more worth bribing, using the Governor’s 
time horizon to stand for “all agents” is a necessary modeling simplification. 
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population share with high school education or higher (same sources plus Maxwell and Winters 
2004), inequality (Uslaner, 2008), the scale of government, per capita constant-dollar state 
government revenues or expenditures (Goel and Nelson 1998; Alt and Lassen 2003, 2008), state 
population (Maxwell and Winters 2004), divided government, where legislature and executive 
are controlled by different parties (Alt and Lassen 2008), degree of urbanization (Alt and Lassen 
2003), decentralization (Goel and Nelson 2010), and citizen ideology. Corruption is expected to 
be higher where government scale is larger (more temptation), where population is bigger, and 
where urbanization is higher, and lower where incomes and average education are higher and 
where there is divided government. Details and sources of data are provided in the Appendix.20 
 Cross-national institutional studies of corruption suggest other underlying causes 
including political-civil liberty, decentralization of power, checks and balances, presidential 
government, participation, political competition, instability, electoral rules, and constraints on 
the chief executive.21 Many of these factors are constant or nearly so across the period we 
consider within states as well as across states in some cases. Effects of unchanging factors, 
including “cultures” of corruption (Peters and Welch, 1978; Johnston, 1983), are subsumed by 
state fixed effects. Changes that affect all states equally (aspects of federal enforcement like 
sentencing guidelines, for instance) are picked up in the year fixed effects. 
II.4 Specification and identification 
                                                 
20 Since corruption is a white-collar crime, the white-collar crime rate (fraud, embezzlement, forgery, and bribery) 
could also be useful as an instrument for enforcement, but despite extensive searches and requests of published data 
we have been unable obtain this by district or state and year earlier than 1996. 
21 Seldadyo and de Haan (2005) find the closest stable and robust correlates of corruption to be a dozen clustered 
variables (rule of law, judicial independence and impartial courts, government effectiveness, GDP per capita, 
political stability, regulatory quality, bureaucratic quality, law and order, labor market regulation, international trade, 
internal conflict, and secondary school enrollment) reflecting “the capacity of government to regulate and enforce 
law.” Controlling for this factor in a version of extreme bounds analysis reveals (after 713,460 regressions) that 
population density (negative for corruption), Scandinavian legal origin (negative), and ethnic conflict (positive) are 
other robust predictors. Less stably correlated variables include the illiteracy rate (negative) or primary school 
enrollment (positive), the government wage (positive), dependence on fuel exports (positive), presidential 
government (negative), and female labor force participation (negative). 
 17
The panel structure of our data allows us to investigate the effect of prosecutorial resources on 
corruption convictions taking into account both invariant differences across states and common 
changes across time. The basic model that we estimate is 
,
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First, we focus on the main estimating equation (1).22 Here, corruption in state i at time t 
is explained by prosecutorial resources, denoted EOUSA, measured by the EOUSA’s FTE 
attorneys per million population. The matrix X contains the other variables reviewed above and 
 and  are the state and year fixed-effects, respectively. 
Equation (2) allows for the possibility, introduced above, that prosecutorial resources are 
chosen endogenously. To estimate the effect of prosecutorial resources in a consistent way, we 
introduce a set of instrumental variables, Z, which includes past corruption convictions as of two 
periods ago (since more convictions in a district could affect future staffing levels) and partisan 
factors. 23  To estimate how far partisan Presidents target prosecutorial resources toward 
opponents and away from supporters (Schlesinger and Meier 2002), we include a variable to 
measure the congruence between the President currently appointing US attorneys and the 
ideology of the state population. This variable, Republican congruence, is equal to the share of 
self-declared conservative voters when the appointing President is a Republican and zero 
otherwise. In addition, we include a variable allowing for enforcement resources to be influenced 
by the degree of urbanization, which also influences corruption directly, interacted with the share 
of Democrats in the state senate, again to get at political motivations for the allocation of 
                                                 
22 For an explicit derivation of an empirical model very similar to our equation 1, though lacking any reference to 
endogeneity, see Cordis (2009). 
23 Whitford (2002) shows that prosecutor staffing is affected by national political trends, including ideology and 
partisanship. 
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resources. As identifying the causes of prosecutorial resource allocation is interesting in its own 
right, we examine this separately. However, for our instrumental variables strategy to work, we 
do not need to include all potential determinants in Z, and we select the configuration of partisan 
factors to maximize our potential for credible inference. 
The viability of the instrumental variables approach depends, in addition to the 
requirement that the instrumental variables Z affect the potentially endogenous variable, on an 
exclusion restriction, which here is the assumption that partisan factors and past corruption 
convictions affect contemporaneous corruption convictions only though their effect on 
enforcement resources and priorities. In fact, our panel data instrumental variables model with 
fixed effects requires an assumption of strongly exogenous instruments, i.e. that 
 , ,1 ,| , ,..., 0,i t i i i TE z z i    , for the estimation to be consistent (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, ch. 
22). This is a strong assumption, as it implies that the contemporaneous error is uncorrelated 
with all, both past and future, values of the instruments. In particular, since we include a lagged 
dependent variable as instrument, this implies that we assume that the number of corruption 
prosecutions at the state level at time 2t   affects current prosecutions only through its effect on 
prosecutorial resources. We do, however, note below that our results are unaltered by excluding 
this particular instrumental variable from the analysis and examine, if indirectly, the 
appropriateness of the exclusion restriction through tests for overidentification. Regarding the 
effect of partisan forces on corruption decisions, the exclusion restriction is that partisan factors 
affect the number of corruption convictions only through enforcement resources, controlling for 
state fixed effects and common year effects.  
Finally, we estimate the model with panel-robust (clustered) standard errors, which both 
corrects for heteroskedasticity and potential serial correlation in the errors and results in 
 19
consistent estimates of the variance matrix, in contrast to the standard heteroskedasticity-robust 
correction for panel data models (Stock and Watson, 2008). Instrumental variables regression in 
a panel context with time and unit fixed effects is demanding on the data, as both state and time 
fixed effects enter also in the estimation of EOUSA, the first stage, together with all other 
explanatory variables X. While our instrumental variables have good explanatory power on their 
own, they are not sufficiently strong in the first-stage regression for a standard two-stage least 
squares estimation to be unbiased. As noted by the literature on weak instruments (e.g. Staiger 
and Stock, 1997), this can cause considerable bias in the TSLS-estimates. For this reason, we 
employ two alternative IV estimators, the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) and 
the GMM Continually Updating Estimator (CUE), both of which can provide unbiased 
estimators even when instruments are too weak for TSLS to be trusted (e.g. Stock, Wright and 
Yogo, 2002). Again, however, the relative performance depends on the presence of 
heteroskedasticity as well as clustering and serial correlation in the standard errors. While 
research on this issue is on-going, current best practice seems to be to estimate the model by 
CUE in the presence of weak and/or many instruments as well as clustering. 
III. Estimation Results 
Table 1 reports, as a benchmark, results from a standard fixed effects estimation where attorneys 
per million population in the state (“EOUSA” above; henceforth “Attorneys”) is treated as being 
exogenously determined. The first column shows results from a model with only state fixed 
effects in addition to the Attorneys variable, the second column includes year effects and the 
third column includes the full set of controls. The estimate for the effect of Attorneys is positive 
and similar across specifications and consistently significant at the 5 or 1 per cent levels.  
[Table 1 about here] 
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One feature of corruption cases is that convictions can come in clumps since many 
investigations involve multiple targets. This means that an annual count will appear noisy, even 
though underlying developments are actually reasonably smooth. A consequence of this is that 
our dependent variable will have considerable measurement error, possibly affecting estimates. 
For this reason, we show in columns 4-6 results for the first three specifications for the case of a 
three-year unweighted moving-average measure of the dependent variable. Here, estimates are 
smaller, consistent with the idea that the moving average transformation has eliminated some 
measurement error. The number of observations is also slightly higher here, as the smoothing of 
the time series eliminates a number of missing observations. 
We find little impact of relative wages in these estimates. However, some alternate 
estimators discussed below do yield estimates consistent with the underlying deterrence theory. 
Binding gubernatorial term limits also, weakly, tend to be associated with more corruption 
convictions, as predicted. Overall, these estimates also offer very limited support for deterrence 
effects.  
Estimated effects of other control variables generally reflect findings elsewhere in the 
literature. Divided government is consistently and in a significant way associated with lower 
corruption, as in Alt and Lassen (2008). States with higher levels of per capita government 
revenues see significantly more corruption convictions, as in Goel and Nelson (1998), while 
states with a larger share of the population living in urban areas see more corruption, as in some 
specifications in Glaeser and Saks (2006). Higher per capita income levels are weakly associated 
with lower corruption, as are larger shares of the population having a high school degree, 
consistent with the cross-sectional evidence of Meier and Holbrook (1992) and Glaeser and Saks 
(2006). The results for inequality are variable, usually negative and not significant in the first 
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stage but positive, and sometimes significant, in the second stage. While not shown, state and 
year fixed effects are significant, the former subsuming all institutional state characteristics that 
did not change in the period we consider. 
 Table 2 reports results from our main instrumental variables specifications for our two 
measures of the dependent variable. The first column shows the first-stage regression, which is 
the same for the LIML-estimator and the CUE shown in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The 
instruments all contribute to explaining the allocation of enforcement resources in a significant 
way, both individually and jointly: past corruption convictions increase enforcement resources, 
as does the combination of a strong Democratic presence in the state senate and more urbanized 
populations, while states with more voters identifying themselves as “conservatives” are 
allocated less prosecutorial resources under Republican presidential administrations. An F-test 
for joint significance of the instruments returns a value of 7.31, which has a p-value of .0004. 
The F-test suggests that the jointly significant instruments are well beyond the critical values 
necessary for unbiased estimation using LIML and CUE, though (as discussed above) not 
sufficiently strong for us to rely on standard two-state least squares estimation.24  
[Table 2 about here] 
Results for the control variables are largely as above. Some differences exist, both 
relative to the OLS results and between the two dependent variables. Overall, higher revenue 
levels, urbanization rates, and a more right-leaning citizenry are all associated with more 
convictions. With less consistency across specifications, inequality is associated with more 
convictions and in contrast, divided government is associated with fewer convictions. .  
                                                 
24 Our F-test statistics are 7.31 and 7.23, respectively, above the most restrictive critical value of 6.46 as tabulated by 
Stock and Yogo (2005) and reported in the output of the Stata-routine xtivreg2. 
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However, correcting for the endogenous allocation of enforcement resources results in a 
considerably larger estimate of the effect of enforcement resources on corruption prosecutions 
than that produced by the OLS-specification reported in Table 1. For both estimation methods, 
the estimated coefficient is two to three times the least squares panel estimate. The LIML 
estimates on enforcement resources are slightly larger than those based on CUE. Of course, in 
contrast to the OLS estimate, the IV-estimate takes into account the endogenous allocation of 
resources aimed at achieving an optimal allocation of resources, measuring the effect of a 
marginal FTE attorney assuming that the EOUSA wishes to optimize resources, allowing for 
political considerations. 
The magnitude of this estimated effect can be approximated as follows. An estimated 
coefficient of .642 suggests that hiring one more FTE assistant US attorney (per inhabitant, 
measured in millions) on average will increase the (logged) number of corruption convictions 
(per inhabitant, measured in millions) by .642, or increase the number by 1.9 (+/- .9) convictions. 
This should be compared to the corresponding OLS estimate of .8 +/- .3 (Table 1, column 6), 
which reflects the average, across the sample, relationship between the number of FTE assistant 
district attorneys and the number of convictions for corruption.  
III.1. Robustness: Instruments, Measurement and Estimation 
The results for prosecutor resources presented in Table 2 are robust to exclusion of individual 
instruments or subsets of instruments in a qualitative sense. In every model we look at, Attorneys 
has a positive effect on the number of corruption convictions, though with some variations in 
magnitude. The estimated coefficients are always significant at least at the 10 percent level. 
Furthermore, diagnostics generally support the IV-identification strategy. 
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We undertook a variety of robustness tests, including alternative estimators focusing on 
particular characteristics of the data as well as alternative measurements in addition to the 
moving averages already utilized in Tables 1 and 2. In the analysis above, a correction was 
needed to the log transformation of the number of convictions relative to population (as it is not 
possible to take the natural log of zero) in order to include observations with zero in the analysis. 
We investigated various transformations and corrections, and all yielded similar results. Table 3 
presents some results. To avoid transformations, the first two columns report results from an 
instrumental-variables tobit analysis, using as dependent variables the number of convictions 
relative to population and a moving average version of this, in both cases explicitly allowing for 
zero convictions as a special outcome. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Using the IV-tobit comes at a price, however, as it is not possible to include the panel 
structure (and, thus, state fixed effects) in the analysis. The results are, however, broadly similar 
to what we observed above, the main difference being stronger results on a number of control 
variables. While divided government continues to be associated with lower corruption in a 
significant way, we now also observe strongly significant relationships for the share of the 
population with high school, the relative wage, and unemployment, all associated with lower 
corruption, and state population size and a more left-leaning citizenry, both associated with 
higher corruption, where the latter result is the reverse of the results so far. The strong result on 
the relative wage is particularly noteworthy, as it is consistent with cross-country and cross-state 
evidence cited above. It is not, nor are results on the other control variables, an artifact of the 
lack of state fixed effects, but rather attributable to the tobit-specification.25 
                                                 
25 Our other specifications, like those in Tables 1 and 2 but with fixed effects omitted, give similar results. 
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In this specification the coefficient of Attorneys measures the marginal effect of 
increasing enforcement on convictions under a latent variable interpretation. Since the dependent 
variable is no longer log-transformed, the coefficient of 1.2 can be compared directly to the 
effects of increasing resources reported above. These were equal to .8 and 1.9 for the OLS- and 
IV-specifications, respectively. In sum, the IV-tobit analysis suggests results between the others, 
closer to the OLS-results and considerably smaller than the IV-panel results. 
Columns 3 and 4 report a different standardization, showing results when the dependent 
variable is defined as the log of the number of corruption convictions relative to the number of 
FTE state and local government employees in millions, as above for both the annual and the 
moving average definitions.26 The qualitative results are the same, which is reassuring but not 
too surprising as the number of government employees is highly correlated with state population. 
The results here are slightly larger than those reported above, owing to the smaller denominator; 
for example, the estimate for the MA-measure is .8, compared to .65 above, which is equivalent 
to a marginal effect of 2.2 +/- 1.0.  
III.2. The Alleviation of System Strain and Deterrence 
According to deterrence theory, increased resources for enforcement should, by increasing 
overall expected penalties for corruption, deter public officials and public sector employees 
contemplating corrupt acts. In our case, that would appear as a negative estimate for the effect of 
enforcement resources. Do the consistently positive signs on enforcement resources imply that 
there is no deterrence effect? In this section, we investigate this question in an exploratory way.  
Since the effects of system strain and deterrence go in opposite directions, the (strong) 
alleviation of system strain or overload could mask contemporaneous lagged deterrence effects. 
                                                 
26 Since the convictions number reported includes also federal employees in a state, we implicitly assume that the 
number of federal employees in a state is proportional to the number of state and local government employees. 
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There is no question that the number of attorneys steadily increased (refer back to Figure 2) as 
the EOUSA built up the framework for the legal attack on corruption (Maass 1987 and 
Archambeault and Elmore 1983). We begin by examining whether the workload of EOUSA 
attorneys changed. One way to examine that is to chart the ratio of cases pursued (or filed) to 
total number of cases (pursued and declined) referred from law enforcement agencies. Figure 3 
reports raw and moving-average--smoothed numbers from TRACFED beginning in 1986.27 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Initially, the ratio of cases filed to total number of cases was approximately one-third, 
with some yearly fluctuations, shown by the solid blue line in the figure. The stability of the 
early period is more clear in the smoothed version of the same data (the dashed, red line). Based 
on this, evidence points toward a structural change in 1994 or 1995, when the share of filings 
begins trending upwards. This shift in the ratio reflects a drop in the number of declinations, as 
the average number of filings (the dashed-dotted green line) is reasonably constant in the period 
we consider. At the same time, enforcement resources grew steadily in the period, though at a 
slower pace post 1990 (Figure 2 again). Together, these observations suggest that system strain 
eased somewhat in the period, as relatively more personnel were available to handle relatively 
fewer referrals. With system strain easing, the probability of convicting a corrupt offender should 
increase, opening up a potentially larger role for deterrence.28  
In our empirical framework, the alleviation of system strain should represent itself as a 
smaller coefficient on enforcement resources from the early 1990s onwards. A simple way to 
                                                 
27 Of course, referrals could have involved better or worse cases: we assume a constant level of quality in terms of 
referrals over time. 
28 Indeed, the proportion of cases pursued that result in convictions has risen in recent years. However, that need not 
be because system strain as we have defined it has eased: for example, the quality of referrals could have improved. 
Evidence from the most recent years is also not yet comparable to historical data due the large share of cases still 
pending (OIGs Audit Report 09-03 on Resource Management of United States’ Attorneys Offices). 
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model this is by incorporating a shift parameter for the effect of enforcement resources post-1994 
in the regression. This is shown in column 1 in Table 4; the specification is as in Table 1 above, 
though it allows for the fixed effects as well as the coefficient on enforcement resources to be 
different before and after 1994. The interaction term is negative, and close to significant, 
consistent with the interpretation that system strain was easing post-1994. As above, year fixed 
effects control for changes in priorities affecting all states in the same way. If, however, some 
states but not other experienced changes in priorities, this is modeled explicitly here by allowing 
the fixed effects to differ across time. Thus, the results presented here remain robust to such 
state-specific changes in priorities. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As long as the “system strain” and “deterrence” effects of enforcement go in opposite 
directions, the observed decline in the effect of enforcement resources post 1994 could also be 
interpreted as an increase in the relative importance of deterrence. Beyond this recent trend, 
suppose further that the observed empirical estimate of the causal effect of enforcement 
resources on corruption convictions is at any time a net effect, combining both short run effects 
of system strain with longer-run effects of deterrence. To explore this possibility in more depth, 
we estimate the temporal impact of enforcement resources using a distributed lag model. We do 
this by including in the IV-specification of Table 2 a (twice) lagged value of enforcement, 
alongside the current level, mirroring the two-period lag in the instruments. We also include a 
lagged dependent variable to estimate the long-term impact of enforcement. While there are 
well-known issues with estimating dynamic fixed effects models by including directly the lagged 
dependent variable into a standard OLS fixed effects framework, the long time series that we 
have available here suggests that this is a minor concern.  
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Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 show the results for the IV-specifications, now with two 
endogenous variables. While IV-diagnostics are not as strong as before, owing to the fact that we 
have to instrument two endogenous variables with the same set of instruments, they are still 
supportive of the IV-specifications. As before, the contemporaneous effect is significant and 
there is some suggestive evidence of a negative lagged effect suggesting a delayed role for 
deterrence, consistent with a timeline where contemporaneous increases in enforcement 
resources affect contemporaneous decisions to engage in corruption, (sometimes) resulting in 
referrals and convictions cases showing up in the statistics in the following years. We calculate 
long-run estimates as  1 2 / (1 )    where 1  and 2 are the contemporaneous and lagged 
effects of (endogenous) Attorneys, respectively, while   is the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable. These long-run net effects, of .5 and .32, respectively, are considerably 
smaller than the direct effect estimates shown in Table 2.  
This exploratory analysis suggests that important features of the system of corruption 
prosecutions have changed over time. However, there are limits to our ability from these data to 
pinpoint what changed and exactly when changes occurred. Our IV-specification does not allow 
us to split the sample at or around 1994, as the IVs in this case become quite weak both before 
and after 1994. Similarly, split sample analysis of the OLS specification (not shown) produces 
estimates that are specification-dependent, with inter-period differences that do not rise to 
conventional levels of significance.  
IV. Concluding Summary 
The use of panel data on corruption convictions, new data on prosecutor resources along 
with better data on state-level relative incomes, and careful attention to endogeneity as well as 
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fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources 
on convictions of those who undertake corrupt acts.  We find that greater prosecutor resources 
result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. The results are robust to various 
ways of measuring the number of convictions, including moving averages and deflation by both 
population and the number of state and local government employees, and to various estimators 
addressing complications arising from the nature of the data. The results suggest that effects of 
system overload dominate those of deterrence on convictions, though probably to a lesser extent 
in more recent years. Moreover, we explicitly allow for the allocation of prosecutorial resources 
to be determined endogenously, by past corruption convictions and political considerations, and 
show that this specification leads to larger, though not unrealistic, estimates of the effect of 
resources on convictions.  
Moreover, every specification that allows for endogenous prosecutor resources estimates 
a negative effect of relative public sector pay on corruption, as predicted by deterrence theory, 
though only in some specifications does the estimate rise to conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  Furthermore, divided government, at least in its party control of separated branches 
form, appears associated with lower corruption despite all these other consideration, while term 
limits, often held responsible for poor political performance, appear to be associated with higher 
corruption. Finally, the analysis takes into account and confirms in a panel context, a number of 
previously identified political and economic correlates and causes of corruption, like the effects 
of checks and balances, income, education, population, and fiscal scale, though the magnitudes 
and significance of their effects are somewhat specification-dependent  
 A valuable next step is to push further the analysis of partisan forces. While we lack data 
in TRACFED before 1986, there is evidence that changes of partisanship across some 
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Presidential administrations alter prosecutorial effort in the way Posner and Gordon suggest. If 
we look again at cases referred and cases chosen for prosecution or declined, as above, we can 
see, in the case of the Clinton administration, that U.S. Attorneys in 1993-94 filed slightly more 
cases relative to 1991-92, but not nearly as many more as were referred. This revealed “effort” in 
1993-94 (relative to 1991-92 in the same locale) clearly declined relatively more in more liberal 
areas. In simple regressions (results not shown), the interaction of ideology and lagged effort is 
negative and more than twice its standard error.  Of course, we also cannot reject the 
counterhypothesis that workload expanded faster than capacity to file charges, leading to the 
apparent decline in effort, consistent with the “system strain” results reported above. In the case 
of the recent Bush administration, prosecutorial effort appears politicized in the same way, 
though with a slightly greater delay. Also, any apparent ideological bias in effort fades out in 
2005-6, which maybe is why some U.S. Attorneys were subsequently fired! Further research 
using this data and other sources, though not easy, could determine the partisan affiliation of 
convicted officials in many cases, and biographical research could in principle even determine 
the partisanship of the President appointing the judge in each case. 
Finally, how general are our results? Several things distinguish our sample from a broad 
cross-section of countries: higher incomes, the serious nature of the offenses (unlike the 
ubiquitous petty corruption reported elsewhere), and omnipresent enforcement, without which 
our model does not work. In the literature there is more or less a consensus that democracy 
reduces corruption, especially when democracy is synonymous with other related variables like 
freedom of the press and the rule of law (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). We see no obvious reason 
that, conditional on the presence of democracy or the rule of law which proxy for enforcement, 
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other effects like those of government wages and inequality on corruption should not appear in a 
cross-national analysis. Finding out whether that is right is a challenge that remains before us. 
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A. Data appendix 
 
 
Corruption Convictions: The Public Integrity Section of the US Department of Justice (Maxwell 
and Winters 2004, 2005) reports “criminal abuses of public trust by government officials”, based 
primarily on reports from U.S. Attorney offices. Originally the statute mandated reporting such 
abuses by elected officials, but individual cases reported in detail make it clear that the reports 
include non-elected public officials as well and others involved in corrupting them. The Section, 
created by the 1977 Ethics in Government Act, prosecutes some cases, but the great majority of 
cases are prosecuted by U. S. Attorneys. The 1983 Report of the Public Integrity Sections notes a 
change in the reporting and counting practice, notably including lower level employees, which 
caused in increase in the number of convictions from then on. These changes are subsumed by 
the year fixed effects. 
From 1986 on more detailed data is available by judicial district at tracfed.syr.edu. Data 
on individual cases can be retrieved, offering the possibility of breaking down cases by the level 
of official involved within districts and states, as well as referrals, charges filed, and cases 
declined. The data here are a subset of the Public Integrity data, and it is not clear what causes 
the differences. The number of filings from the Tracfed data and the number of convictions from 
the Public Integrity Sections has a correlation coefficient of .74. Total number of referrals equal 
filings and declinations as reported by Tracfed. Effort equals filings divided by referrals. In 
1993-94, referred to in the text, the average number of referrals across states was 37.9 (sd 45.0), 
ranging from 0 to 231. Average effort was .30, ranging from 0 to 1. 
Elected officials: Data on the number of popularly elected state and local officials for the years 
1977, 1987, and 1992 used in the calculation are from Table 2 of Volume 1, no. 2, "Popularly 
Elected Officials" of the U.S. Census Bureau, 1992 Census of Governments. These are available 
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at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/cog92.html. Data for the intervening years were 
interpolated by averaging over time. Since numbers reported by the Section evidently include 
non-elected officials and some non-officials it is in fact not an entirely correct deflation. 
Inequality: Ratio of 90th to 10th percentile of male wage income, from Gelman (2008). 
Relative wages: We use the BEA data, which are in current dollars for state and local 
government employees (in total, and from 1979- by state and local separately), adjusted by “Full 
time and part time wage and salary employment” for the same categories, to calculate the  
average wage in current dollars of state and local government employees.29 To be in real terms, 
we adjusted this for inflation using the regional CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, divided 
into West, Midwest, Northeast and South. We also obtained in a similar way the average wage 
and salary disbursements by state, to compare with public sector wages.  
Real per capita income, government expenditures and federal transfers: Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, various years 
Divided government and tax and expenditure limits: The Book of the States, various years. 
Education and percent urban population: Bureau of the Census.  
Population: State Politics & Policy Data Resource, http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/datasets.shtml 
Term limits: Data from Alt et al. (2008). For the whole sample period 14 states had no 
gubernatorial term limits, 18 states had two-term limits, and one state, VA, had a one-term limit 
throughout. Seven further states began with one-term limits but switched to two-term limits, 
while eight further states switched from no to two-term limits, The last group all switched in the 
early 1990s. The breakdown of states is as follows:   
States with no effective term limits during the sample period: CT, ID, IL, IA, MA, MN, 
NH, NY, ND, TX, UT, VT, WA, WI.  
                                                 
29 Part timers are problematic, and we omit them. 
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States with 2-term limits: AL, DE, FL, IN, KS, LA, ME, MD, MO, NE, NV, NJ, OH, OK, 
OR, PA, SD, and WV.  
States switching within the sample period from 1- to 2-term limits (with year of switch): 
GA (1976), KY (1994), MS (1994), NM (1990), NC (1977), SC (1980), and TN (1978). 
States switching within the sample period from no to 2-term limits (with year). AZ 
(1992), AR (1992), CA (1990), CO (1990), MI (1992), MT (1992), RI (1994), and WY 
(1992) 
Ideology: Berry et al.’s (1998) measures of citizens and government ideology, 0 (conservative) - 
100 (liberal). For the years 1993-94 referred to in the text, the average of the government 
ideology variable was 52.9 (sd equal 22.3), ranging from 1.7 to 93.0. 
Voter ideology shares: Aggregated CBS News/New York Times national polls [electronic file], 
collected by Gerald C. Wright, John P. McIver and Robert S. Erikson 
(http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/cbs7603_pct.zip). 
 [Table A.1 about here] 
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Table A.1: Summary statistics 
   mean sd min  max 
Convictions / population^  2.96 2.87 0  25.29 
log (Convictions / population)^  ‐1.09 5.54 ‐16.12  3.23 
EOUSA FTE attorneys per million population  13.25 5.45 2.18  36.53 
Relative government wages  0.97 0.07 0.78  1.18 
Inequality: Male wages  16.92 3.77 8.24  31.42 
Divided government  0.46 0.50 0  1 
Real per capita income ($1000)  13.36 2.75 7.71  23.28 
Real per capita gov revenues ($1000)  1.70 0.44 0.83  3.83 
Percent high school graduates  0.49 0.07 0.30  0.62 
Log of Population (millions)  1.21 0.99 ‐0.79  3.56 
Binding one‐term limit  0.05 0.21 0  1 
Binding two‐term limit  0.22 0.41 0  1 
Unemployment  5.95 2.08 2.30  17.40 
Citizen ideology measure  47.57 14.73 8.45  95.97 
Percent living in urban areas  67.27 21.20 26.03  100.00 
Republican congruence  20.09 17.81 0  66.70 
Urbanization*Share of Democrats in state senate^^ 38.70 17.42 3.37  86.49 
Sample: n = 1152 (sample from moving average regressions), except ^ which has 1138 and  
  ^^ which has 1128.         
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Table 1. Enforcement and corruption convictions: OLS with fixed effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
EOUSA FTE attorneys per million population 0.29*** 0.25** 0.28** 0.28*** 0.20* 0.20*
[0.05] [0.10] [0.11] [0.06] [0.10] [0.10]
Relative government wages -31.45 -8.14
[83.25] [73.16]
Inequality: Male wages 0.09 0.06
[0.07] [0.07]
Divided government -0.71* -0.58**
[0.37] [0.28]
Real per capita income ($1000) -0.49 -0.40
[0.33] [0.32]
Real per capita gov revenues ($1000)^ 3.24** 2.73**
[1.50] [1.27]
Percent high school graduates -3.25 -8.53
[9.78] [10.32]
Log of Population (millions) 4.99 1.75
[3.51] [2.90]
Binding one-term limit 1.75 1.34
[1.37] [1.31]
Binding two-term limit 0.58 0.29
[0.41] [0.33]
Unemployment^ -0.04 -0.04
[0.17] [0.15]
Citizen ideology measure -0.06* -0.05*
[0.03] [0.03]
Percent living in urban areas^ 0.27 0.25
[0.18] [0.16]
Observations 1,327 1,327 1,138 1,343 1,343 1,152
R-squared 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.18
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the state level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  ^denotes lagged twice.
A constant was included in all regressions, but results are not reported.
Calculation carried out in Stata 11.1 using xtreg.
Annual corruption measure Moving average corruption measure
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Table 2: Enforcement and corruption convictions: Panel IV-analysis 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV: LIML IV: CUE OLS IV: LIML IV: CUE
EOUSA FTE attorneys per million population 0.91** 0.87** 0.70** 0.64**
[0.46] [0.37] [0.32] [0.30]
Relative government wages 53.02 -39.99 -42.35 55.59 -25.62 -9.80
[49.91] [90.34] [87.20] [50.61] [77.88] [75.45]
Inequality: Male wages -0.06 0.16* 0.17** -0.06 0.11 0.09
[0.05] [0.09] [0.09] [0.05] [0.08] [0.07]
Divided government 0.09 -0.51 -0.43 0.10 -0.47* -0.44*
[0.20] [0.39] [0.37] [0.20] [0.28] [0.26]
Real per capita income ($1000) -0.27 -0.14 -0.18 -0.24 -0.25 -0.23
[0.24] [0.44] [0.42] [0.25] [0.36] [0.35]
Real per capita gov revenues ($1000)^ -1.87 4.44** 4.55*** -1.95 3.85** 3.75**
[1.34] [1.84] [1.76] [1.31] [1.58] [1.55]
Percent high school graduates 5.55 -6.42 -8.06 5.55 -11.57 -11.37
[6.95] [8.08] [7.59] [7.09] [8.39] [8.17]
Log of Population (millions) -11.74*** 13.07 13.67* -11.66*** 8.20 7.95
[3.53] [8.49] [7.27] [3.55] [5.79] [5.17]
Binding one-term limit -2.19* 2.78 2.64 -2.20* 2.34 2.2
[1.23] [1.85] [1.73] [1.20] [1.80] [1.76]
Binding two-term limit 0.25 0.41 0.41 0.24 0.18 0.18
[0.26] [0.36] [0.37] [0.26] [0.29] [0.28]
Unemployment^ 0.44*** -0.28 -0.27 0.43*** -0.22 -0.16
[0.11] [0.23] [0.21] [0.11] [0.19] [0.17]
Citizen ideology measure 0.05* -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.05* -0.07** -0.07**
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
Percent living in urban areas^ -0.05 0.35* 0.40** -0.05 0.29* 0.27*
[0.14] [0.19] [0.18] [0.13] [0.16] [0.15]
Instrument: Dependent variable_t - 2 0.05** 0.04**
[0.02] [0.02]
Instrument: Republican congruence_t-2 -0.06*** -0.06***
[0.02] [0.02]
Instrument: Urbanization*Share of Democrats 0.05* 0.05*
  in state senate_t-2 [0.03] [0.03]
Observations 1,101 1,101 1,101 1,113 1,113 1,113
R-squared 0.79 0.79
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
J-statistic 0.985 0.979 0.712 0.731
p-value 0.611 0.613 0.701 0.694
F 1st stage 7.308 7.308 7.233 7.233
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the state level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  ^denotes lagged twice.
A constant was included in all regressions, but results are not reported.
Calculation carried out in Stata 11.1 using xtreg and xtivreg2.
Annual corruption measure Moving average corruption measure
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Table 3: Enforcement and corruption convictions: Robustness 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual MA Annual MA
IVTOBIT IVTOBIT CUE CUE
EOUSA FTE attorneys per million population 1.17*** 1.06*** 1.01** 0.75**
[0.21] [0.216] [0.43] [0.34]
Relative government wages -145.03*** -129.80*** -48.78 -13.50
[37.11] [32.413] [100.41] [86.81]
Inequality: Male wages 0.06 0.04 0.20** 0.11
[0.06] [0.047] [0.10] [0.08]
Divided government -0.57* -0.49* -0.50 -0.51*
[0.32] [0.258] [0.43] [0.30]
Real per capita income ($1000) -0.03 -0.00 -0.19 -0.25
[0.16] [0.000] [0.49] [0.40]
Real per capita gov revenues ($1000)^ -0.37 -0.00 5.18** 4.26**
[0.62] [0.001] [2.03] [1.79]
Percent high school graduates -16.59*** -14.93*** -9.09 -12.91
[5.70] [3.974] [8.76] [9.42]
Log of Population (millions) 2.06*** 1.76*** 16.04* 9.43
[0.40] [0.378] [8.43] [5.98]
Binding one-term limit -0.12 -0.30 3.14 2.67
[0.76] [0.457] [2.00] [2.02]
Binding two-term limit 0.31 0.11 0.48 0.21
[0.39] [0.328] [0.43] [0.33]
Unemployment^ -0.62*** -0.58*** -0.32 -0.19
[0.18] [0.173] [0.24] [0.19]
Citizen ideology measure 0.03** 0.03** -0.12*** -0.08**
[0.02] [0.015] [0.03] [0.03]
Percent living in urban areas^ -0.01 -0.01 0.46** 0.31*
[0.01] [0.011] [0.20] [0.17]
Observations 1,101 1,113 1,101 1,113
State FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
J-statistic 0.914 0.644
p-value 0.633 0.725
F 1st stage 7.308 7.233
Robust standard errors (cols 1 and 2) corrected for clustering at the state level (cols 3 and 4) in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  ^denotes lagged twice.
A constant was included in all regressions, but results are not reported.
Calculation carried out in Stata 11.1 using ivtobit and xtivreg2.
convictions / mill. population log(conv / state + local gov empl)
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Table 4: Enforcement and corruption convictions: Dynamic issues 
 
   
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
EOUSA FTE attorneys per million population 0.54*** 2.31** 1.63*
[0.14] [1.13] [0.88]
EOUSA FTE attorneys per million population, -0.43
  post 1994 [0.30]
EOUSA FTE attorneys per million population -1.84 -1.31
  lagged: L1 in column 2, L2 in column 3 [1.31] [0.86]
Lagged dependent variable 0.06 0.01
  L1 in column 2, L3 in column 3 [0.04] [0.05]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,042 1,100 1,081
R-squared 0.15
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
J-statistic 0.060 0.246
p-value 0.807 0.620
F 1st stage 2.393 3.309
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the state level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A constant was included in all regressions, but results are not reported.
Calculations carried out in Stata 11.1 using xtreg and xtivreg2.
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Figure 1: Corruption convictions 1977-2003 
a) Corruption convictions by state  
 
 b) Corruption convictions / population (mill.) by year 
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Figure 2:  Range and average of enforcement resources, by year 
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 Figure 3:  The increase of system capacity after 1994 
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